is developed in what was its biology, but for the name, as wen as ethics and anthropology and constitute a pillar of the Stoic system.3 In his book The Stoic Theory ofOikeiosis (1990) Troels Engberg-Pedersen convincingly demonstrates, how the Stoic oikeiosis as opposed to the more substantialistic Aristotelian teleology is more developed from an individual interior viewpoint; the ends are therefore not determined externally by nature, but are developed out of the individuals striving of self-preservation. This striving consists of two or three steps. The first is captured as the 'prote horme', the last, namely 'ratio', also encapsulates the viewpoint of the entire universe, which man, enabled with reason, can and should take on.4
The word indicates an action; as opposed to the Epicurean or Democritean atoms the organic compound has a not entirely mechanically explicable feedback of the parts to the whole and among each other and exists only because of the reflexive processes performed by the compound itself. The process includes that life-supporting things are sought and assimilated and harming things are avoided. For man and animals alike, this requires three components: Firstly, the organism must be equipped with some form of self-consciousness, secondly it must be equipped with practical self-care, and thirdly the successful 'oikeiosis' must be accompanied by the sensation of lust, the unsuccessful 'oikeiosis' by dislike. 'Oikeiosis' can be expanded from the self to other living creatures, to one's housemates, one's children T. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory ofOikeiosis. Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy, Aarhus 1990;  In the presentation of the (in most parts) convincing interpretation the reader is getting the impression, however, that the subjectivist reversal would be re-projected to the beginning of Hellenism. That in itself might not be wrong. However, it should be noted that the dichotomy of object and subject, which Engberg-Pedersen uses unreflectedly, does not show up in the Stoic tradition; on the contrary, it has its origin in the Pyrrhonian scepsis. For the Stoic things do not lose their ontological status and are not degraded to objects for (human) subjects. Annas, Happiness, 161, footnote 8, is also expressing criticism: 'Apart from offering an alternative interpretation, however (one based on objectivity and subjectivity rather than the eudaemonist perspective) Engberg-Pedersen does not offer any arguments against the alternative approach, other than the claim that when the Stoics talk of cosmic nature they are being metaphorical.' See also L. Winkel, 'Die stoische oikeiosis-Lehre und Ulpians Definition der Gerechtigkeit', Zeitschrift der SavignyStiftungfiir Rechtsgeschichte 105 (1988) 669-679. 
